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EMERGENCY PLAN "TAKEOFF"

BREAK-OFF OF KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

18 September 1951

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EMERGENCY PLAN TAKEOFF

BREAKOFF OF KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This plan endeavors to establish, for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations, courses of action for application in preparation for and in the event of a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations.

II

PROBLEM

To develop psychological courses of action to be pursued in preparation for and in the event of breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations.

III

SITUATION

1. Should the present Korean armistice talks fail, the danger of general war will be increased.
2. A period of alarm and spiritual depression will accompany the breakdown of negotiations and during this period the peoples of the world will be psychologically vulnerable.
3. It is imperative that we stand ready to meet this situation during this period of psychological vulnerability, the initiative in psychological matters.

IV

PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING

1. On the principle that sound psychological operations are not independent operations but operations in support of political, economic, and military action,

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and with the purpose of achieving U. S. initiative in the current psychological struggle with the Soviet Union, the following planning precepts are established:

- a. The policies, attitudes, and actions of the United Nations (as they reflect those of the United States) with respect to the initiation, conduct, and termination of the negotiations shall be put forcefully before the world;
- b. Communist propaganda and agitation with respect to the issues involved shall be vigorously undercut;
- c. Psychological planning shall be directed toward the end of achieving marked intensification of anti-Communist attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the free world;
- d. Psychological action shall be thoroughly integrated with United Nations political, economic, and military policy (as it reflects United States political, economic, and military policy).

V

ASSUMPTIONS

1. That the United States continues to act within the framework of UN authorization and seeks constantly to maintain and strengthen UN support for U. S. political, economic, and military policies and actions following workoff of negotiations.
2. That, as sequel to breakdown of negotiations, military operations in Korea, entering into a new phase, may take on greater scope.

VI

CONTINGENCIES TO BE CONSIDERED

1. In approaching the problem, three possible contingencies must be considered:

CONTINGENCY I

- a. There is a definitive end to negotiations;
- b. The Communists launch a mass offensive against UN forces including massive air attacks or submarine action against UN ground, air or naval forces.

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- a. There is a definite end to negotiations;
- b. The Communists launch a massive ground offensive against UN forces;
- c. The enemy does not initiate massive air attacks or submarine action against UN ground or naval forces and his counteraction to UN air attacks is not sufficiently strong to interfere seriously with the effectiveness of UN operations.

CONTINGENCY III

- a. Negotiations fade out or adjourn without a clear break and with possibility existing for renewal at any time;
- b. Communists do not launch massive air attacks or submarine action;
- c. No evidence of increased major enemy ground or air build-up in Korea or Manchuria. (In other words, enemy appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of de facto ceasefire without agreement.)

2. Possible modifications of the above contingencies are foreseeable, but proper planning for the listed contingencies will encompass those modifications should they arise.

VII

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMA. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

- 1. Essential to the task of U. S. psychological operations is the seizure from the Kremlin of the psychological initiative. To accomplish such seizure we must not only anticipate events having psychological import but must also have a properly formulated psychological attack underway prior to the event.
- 2. Our hold on the initiative once gained must then be constantly strengthened by the manner in which it is exploited. The psychological attack must have well-defined objectives, must be of sufficient scope to embrace all foreseeable occurrences, and must be so designed as to allow ample room for maneuver under any expected circumstance or set of circumstances.

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3. The psychological attack must not only must outguess all possible courses of action by the enemy, in order that these courses of action can be immediately countered, but also must create situations which will allow the enemy no choice but to move into psychologically disadvantageous positions.

4. In addition, in the case of the Korean armistice negotiations the psychological attack must be governed by certain special considerations. Constantly it must be borne in mind that any action taken prior to an actual breakdown must not jeopardize, and preferably should enhance, the possibility of achieving our real, immediate objectives, which, in the case of Korean armistice negotiations, are specifically:

- (1) To further the early and favorable completion of the negotiations;
- (2) To ensure that the United Nations and the United States are credited before the world for the successes obtained at the negotiations, and that the Soviet Union is blamed for all delays, obstacles, and failures.

5. In addition, any psychological action relevant to anticipated breakdown of armistice negotiations should be such as to assist in the principal U. S. international objective of building the moral, economic, and military strength of the free world and the attaining and holding of political unity among the nations now under the domination of Soviet Communism.

B. INITIATING THE ATTACK AND SETTING ITS SCOPE

1. On 4 September 1951 the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference meets in San Francisco. It is expected, and in fact the Soviet press has so stated, that the Soviet delegation will put forward "proposals". Beyond doubt these proposals will be designed to split the free nations. The natural trend for our propaganda to follow will be an increase in intensity of charges of Soviet (and Soviet-led Communist) insincerity, duplicity, intransigence, and aggressive intent. Such a trend fits admirably into the principal purpose of this plan which is to wrest from Communism the psychological initiative. It is only natural also to draw parallels between Soviet obstructive tactics at the Peace Treaty Conference and similar Communist tactics in the Korean situation in general and the Korean armistice negotiations in particular. This, also, admirably fits our purpose.

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3. By maintaining, with forethought, the intensity of our psychological attack at the level it reaches at the Treaty Conference until Korean armistice negotiations enter a political phase, rather than allowing it to drop back to pre-Conference level, we could achieve several advantages:

- (1) Psychological activity would tend to prevent relaxation of free world distrust of Soviet-led Communism.
- (2) Psychological activity would tend to prevent relaxation of recruitment efforts in the U. S. and the free world.
- (3) We could have greater scope for maneuver, and the effect should be more marked, should conditions surrounding the Korean political negotiations dictate a slackening of our propaganda intensity;

Still more important

- (4) Our psychological attack would not only be aiming at a possible target, the Korean political negotiations, but also would be aiming at the actual immediate target of this problem -- the Korean armistice negotiations.

4. It is apparent from the graph above that termination of the Korean armistice talks, whether successful or unsuccessful, will fall somewhere between Japan Peace Treaty Conference and Korean political negotiations. It is natural that a high level of psychological intensity would and should accompany unsuccessful breakdown of Korean armistice negotiations. In the event that an armistice actually occurs our problem merely shifts from negotiations in the purely military field to negotiations in the political field.

5. Thus a high intensity psychological attack initiated concurrently with the Japan Peace Treaty Conference would serve our purpose for the Korean armistice negotiations as well as for possible Korean political negotiations. Speaking in terms of the psychological attack, we would be moving in an event rather than being in the position of having been caught short by events -- the better part of the outcome of the present Kaesong talks.

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C. CREATING SITUATIONS OF ADVANTAGE

1. In the case of the Korean armistice negotiations, a situation can be created which will leave the enemy little, if any, opportunity to move out from under our psychological grasp.

2. Should we fail prior to termination of Korean armistice negotiations the expectancy of a breakoff of those negotiations as the natural result of Communist insincerity, duplicity, and intransigence, it is probable that, in some form, we would have one of the three following situations to face:

- (1) There would be a definitive end to the armistice negotiations.
- (2) There would not be a definitive end to armistice negotiations, but negotiations would fade out without a clear break and with the possibility open for renewal at any time.
- (3) The armistice negotiations would be terminated successfully with political negotiations to follow.

3. Should the first situation above occur, it would be proof of inhumanity on the part of the Communist leaders, and of U. S. charges of insincerity, duplicity, intransigence and aggressive intent on the part of Soviet-led Communism. Before the world the Soviet Union would be credited with failure of the armistice negotiations, political unity among nations opposing Soviet-led Communism would be strengthened, and the free world impetus toward the building of moral, economic, and military strength in the face of the Soviet-Communist menace would increase.

4. Should the second situation above develop, U. S. arguments would become stronger as the period without armistice lengthened. As in the case of the first situation, the insincerity, duplicity, intransigence and aggressive intent of Soviet-led Communism would be cited in placing responsibility for failure to arrive at an armistice settlement. As in the preceding case, also, political unity of the free world would be strengthened and the urge toward moral, economic, and military rearmament would increase.

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5. Should the third situation arrive, nothing would have been lost and much gained. Charges against Soviet-led Communism of insincerity, duplicity, intransigence and aggressive intent would merely be shifted to the political negotiations which would follow the armistice. The special UN (U. S.) objective of achieving a Korean armistice would have been obtained. Success in the armistice negotiations would be attributed to UN confidence and determination and to the growing, and already considerable, moral, economic, and military strength of the free world. The fact of armistice could be taken as proof of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the U. S. psychological attack, and warnings of the Soviet double-cross to come in the political negotiations would prevent relaxation in the anti-Communist attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the free world.

E. SEIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INITIATIVE

Our first and principal objective, then, and the psychological courses of action supporting that objective, as extracted from the above discussion, can be summarized as follows:

To seize from Soviet-led Communism the psychological initiative.

COURSES OF ACTION UNDER THE OBJECTIVE

- (1) Overtly and covertly, concurrently with the Japan Peace Treaty Conference, increase the content percentage of our psychological output attacking Soviet-led Communism in relation to events and issues at Kaesong, and increase cross-relation to Korea of other output.
- (2) Overtly and covertly, build expectancy of a breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations as a result of the insincerity, duplicity, intransigence, and aggressive intent of Soviet-led Communism.

F. PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES EVOLVING FROM ACTUAL BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. Following the initiation of a psychological attack that will give us the psychological initiative in the matter of the Kaesong armistice negotiations and still leave flexibility and room for maneuver in all foreseeable circumstances, it is time to consider the U. S. psychological action which in the event of a breakdown of the armistice negotiations will be required to exploit the initiative.

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2. Should the Korean armistice negotiations fail to result in a successful conclusion, it is imperative that blame be laid unmistakably upon the Koreans and those subservient to the Kremlin. It goes without saying that we must be ready at the onset of breakdown to charge the Communists with full fault by all psychological means available. All propaganda media will carry accusations of the Soviet-led Communists and justification of the UN (U. S.) position, not only on the negotiations as a whole but on the specific issue/over which the breakdown occurs. Properly applied, planning for an actual breakdown of negotiations will adequately serve should the negotiations simply fade out or adjourn without result.

3. In order that action planned for execution at breakoff may have maximum psychological impact and effect, it is necessary that free world opinion be prepared not only for the breakdown of negotiations but also led to the point of acceptance for any and all UN action which may be taken as a result of the breakdown and accompanying or subsequent military action on the part of Soviet-led Communism. To that end, through all normal information media and such means as Congressional committees, etc., there must be a free flow of up-to-the-minute information regarding the events and issues at Kaesong and events elsewhere having bearing on the negotiations. U. S. reporting of events and issues at Kaesong should support anticipated propaganda lines and lay favorable ground, insofar as possible, for acceptance by the free world of such UN (U. S.) political, economic, and military measures as can be foreseen as probable.

4. Should there be definitive breakoff, fade out, or adjournment without result of the armistice negotiations, subsequent UN (U. S.) action will be governed not only by the facts and manner of the termination of the negotiations but also by accompanying or subsequent actions of action initiated by the Communists. In this case it is imperative that worldwide support be obtained for any resultant political, economic, and military action may be taken by the United Nations.

5. Termination of the Kaesong negotiations without armistice agreement can be accepted as an indication of worsening of an already very precarious world

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situation. Psychological measures, therefore, to support all undertakings to maintain and increase free world military strength, will be necessary.

6. Finally, resumption at former scale and perhaps extension of the Korean military operations will undoubtedly core with unsuccessful termination of the Kaesong armistice negotiations. Whatever form the Korean military operations may take, they must be supported by vigorous psychological warfare operations, not only in Korea but also, as the situation dictates, in contiguous areas.

7. National psychological objectives to be pursued in exploiting a breakdown of Korean armistice negotiations develop naturally from the above discussion, and can be listed as follows:

1. To fix moral and political responsibility for what has happened in Korea -- and all bad that will result therefrom -- upon Moscow, with specific responsibility being placed upon Moscow's Chinese and North Korean Communist collaborators.
(Note -- The relative emphasis of blame will of course be varied by area)
2. To establish complete justification for UN (ipso facto U. S.) position on issue or issues over which breakdown takes place, and to destroy any semblance of justification for the Communist opposing position.
3. To justify, and gain worldwide support for, UN (ipso facto U. S.) political, economic, and military measures resultant from breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations.
4. To use the Korean incident to generate support for all undertakings to maintain and increase military strength in the U. S. and in the free world.
5. To assist, in Korea and contiguous areas, UN military operations.

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VIII

PREPARATIONS IN BEING FOR BREAKDOWN
OF ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

A. Informational media, insofar as possible, are staying abreast of events and issues at Kaesong, stating the UN (US) stand; to a degree charging insincerity, duplicity, intransigence, and aggressive intent on the part of Soviet-led Communism; and speculating to some extent not only upon the outcome of the negotiations but also upon what military action by the Chinese and North Korean Communists might follow the breakdown of negotiations.

B. Contingency guidances are now in being for the usual propaganda media in the event of definitive end of the armistice negotiations (See Department of State, Foreign Information Policy Staff, Special Contingency Guidance of 26 July 1950, ARMISTICE BREAKDOWN; and Special Contingency Guidance of 27 July 1951, OPERATION "KUMQUAT").

C. Certain national actions, in themselves psychological or subject to psychological exploitation, are to be expected in the event of breakdown of armistice negotiations. A list of several of these actions, now in process of preparation or under consideration, follows:

- (1) Short statement by General Ridgway on issues of breakdown.
- (2) Major speech by the President on situation created by breakdown.
- (3) Message from the President to:
 - (a) UN troops in Korea;
 - (b) UN governments having troops in Korea.
- (4) Report by the President to the United Nations.
- (5) Intensified effort to obtain more UN troops for Korea.
- (6) Complete economic sanctions against Communist China.
- (7) Additional measures of U.S. mobilization.

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(i) Additional measures to assure security of Southeast Asia:

- (a) Public warning regarding further Communist adventures similar to that in Korea.
- (b) Discussions with all nations of Southeast Asia, including India.

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ANNEX (B)

1. Objective

To fix moral and political responsibility for what has happened in Korea -- and all bad that will result therefrom -- upon Moscow, with specific responsibility being placed upon Moscow's Chinese and North Korean Communist collaborators.

2. Psychological Effects Desired

a. Conviction of the wrongness of the policies and actions of Soviet-led Communism in Korea and strengthened psychological rejection of Soviet-led Communism.

b. Strengthened desire and resolve to oppose the policies and actions of Soviet-led Communism.

Agenda Points for Emphasis

a. Insincerity, duplicity, intransigence, and aggressive intent of Soviet-led Communism -- historically, in Asia in general, specifically in Korea -- with pointing up of falsity of "desire for peace" claims of Soviet-led Communism.

b. Political responsibility of Soviet-led Communism for what has happened in Korea -- and the bad that will result therefrom.

c. Moral responsibility of Soviet-led Communism for what has happened in Korea -- and the bad that will result therefrom.

d. Damaging effect of the Korean actions of Soviet-led Communism on the aspirations of the common man in the world at large and specifically in Asia.

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A WEX (C)

1. Objective

To establish complete justification for UN (ipso facto U.S.) position on issue or issues over which breakdown of armistice negotiations takes place, and to destroy any semblance of justification for the Communist opposing position.

2. Psychological Effects Desired

Conviction of the moral, political, and military rightness of UN stand on controversial issues at Kaesong, and especially on issue over which breakdown takes place, as contrasted with moral, political, and military wrongness of the opposing position of Soviet-led Communism.

3. Propaganda Points for Emphasis

- a. Basic world issues at stake in Korea.
- b. UN determination to achieve world peace and stability contrasted with Soviet-directed endeavors to betray the common aspirations of mankind.
- c. Sincerity, honesty, reasonableness, and desire for peaceful settlement shown by UN Command Delegation at Kaesong negotiations, as contrasted with Soviet-directed Delegation's insincerity, duplicity, intransigence, aggressive intent, and use of negotiations only as cloak of respite behind which to rest and revitalize their badly battered armies.
- d. UN aim in Korean armistice negotiations: to end fighting, but with assurance of security of the troops of the many free nations opposing Soviet-directed aggression in Korea and adequate safeguards against renewal of the Korean hostilities.
- e. Moral, political and military soundness of position of UN Command Delegation on controversial issues at Kaesong, and especially on issue or issues over which actual breakdown occurs, as contrasted with the unacceptable moral, political, and military solutions proffered by the Soviet-directed Delegation.
- f. UN confidence in eventual outcome of the Korean incident.

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ANNEX (U)

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2. Objective

To justify, and gain worldwide support for UN (plus facts U.S.) political, economic, and military measures following breakdown of Korean armistice negotiations.

3. Propaganda Points Desired

- a. Conviction that UN policies and actions following breakdown of Korean armistice negotiations are not only logical but morally justified.
- b. Induce our people to support UN political, economic, and military measures following breakdown of Korean armistice negotiations.

4. Propaganda Points for Emphasis

- a. Absolutism of UN in initiating the additional measures in Korea which follow breakdown of armistice negotiations, and which in actuality were dictated by the ruthless action of Soviet-directed Communism.
- b. Necessity for, and logic of, additional measures in Korea to protect the lives of troops of many free nations now fighting in Korea and to prevent spread of Korean fighting into world conflagration.
- c. Necessity for complete unity among the free nations in supporting morally, politically, economically, and militarily the additional UN measures following breakdown of armistice negotiations.
- d. Importance of the additional UN measures necessitated by breakdown of armistice negotiations, to the procurement of permanent world peace and stability, and consequent importance of these measures for all men.
- e. Anticipated effectiveness of the additional measures in shortening the Korean conflict, successful termination of which will be real and undoubted proof that free men in union to protect their freedom can stop aggression against that freedom, and that world support for the UN is not only logical and desirable but imperative.

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EX (E)

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1. Objective

To use breakdown of Korean armistice negotiations to generate support for all undertakings to maintain and increase military strength in the U.S. and in the free world.

2. Psychological Effects Desired

- a. Conviction that the aggression of Soviet-led Communism must be stopped.
- b. Confidence that aggression of Soviet-led Communism can be stopped.
- c. Desire of the free world to take positive steps toward stopping aggression of Soviet-led Communism.

3. Propaganda Points for Emphasis

- a. Necessity for curbing Soviet-directed aggression. Propagandizing in the following vein:

Breakoff of armistice negotiations through fault of Soviet-led Communism presents real and immediate danger to world peace and stability. Unless aggression by Soviet-directed Communism is curbed in Korea it will break out elsewhere. Breakoff of Korean negotiations prove that Soviet-led Communism is ready to go to any length to satisfy its desire for world domination. Breakoff prove that all "peace" moves of Soviet-directed Communism are merely tactical maneuvers in a grand strategy of imperialism.

- b. Free world ability to curb Soviet-directed aggression. Propagandizing in the following vein:

Soviet proposal for Korean armistice negotiations a ruse for staving off defeat of North Korean and Chinese Communist armies by gaining respite in which to rest and revitalize their defeated and badly battered armies. North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders now throwing away lives and treasure of their peoples in futile effort to regain lost face. Korea has proved,

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ANNEX (F)

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1. Objective

To assist, in Korea and contiguous areas, UN military operations.

2. Psychological Effects Desired:

- a. Lowered morale of North Korean and Chinese troops and civilians supporting Soviet-led Communism.
- b. Heightened morale of North Korean and Chinese peoples desiring defeat of Soviet-led Communism.
- c. An attitude of violent antagonism to Soviet-led Communism in the minds of North Korean and Chinese peoples.
- d. Hopelessness in the minds of North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders, both military and civilian, regarding the military situation.
- e. Explosive three-way distrust between Pyongyang, Peking, and Moscow.
- f. General confusion in the minds of North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders.

3. Points for Propaganda Emphasis

- a. Eventual failure of Soviet-led Communism in Asia because of its inherent unacceptability to Asian peoples.
- b. Military successes of UN forces contrasted with military failure on the part of North Korean and Chinese Communist armies.
- c. Hopelessness of the North Korean and Communist Chinese moral-political-economic-military situation as contrasted with the strong moral-political-economic-military position of the free nations acting confidently in mutual support.
- d. Physical and spiritual hardships imposed upon North Korean and Chinese peoples by Soviet-directed Communism and falsity of promises of a better life under Soviet-led Communism.
- e. North Korean and Communist Chinese ineptness of military leadership, inferiority of weapons, marked insufficiencies of military equipment

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and supplies, and costly war losses in men and equipment, contrasted with UN military aptitude and plenty.

- f. Incipient disunion, contentious division, or actual political or military cleavage between Pyongyang and Peking, Peking and Moscow, or Moscow and Pyongyang.
- g. Political, economic, and military gullibility of North Korean and Chinese leaders; lack of veracity of Communist political announcements, economic reports, and military communiques; mismanagement of North Korean and Communist China communications and failure of the flow of supplies; general and specific economic confusion in North Korea and Communist China; inefficiency of internal administration of North Korea and Communist China; low intellect and wavering purpose of North Korean and Communist China civil officialdom; political intrigue, for personal gain or advancement, of high North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders; rising popular resistance in North Korea and Communist China to Soviet-led Communism, appearing in such acts as local sabotage, boycotts, increased guerrilla activity, etc.

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ANNEX (G)1. Objective

To assist, in Korea and contiguous areas, UN military operations.

2. Discussion

a. In achieving the above objective it is necessary that both overt and covert psychological operations be employed to the limit of our capabilities. Such action, however, must be governed by considerations of the politico-military North Korean and Communist China situation developing.

(1) Detailed plans must be prepared for engendering or inciting, in the North Korean and Chinese troops and civilians, conduct antagonistic to the Soviet-led Communist regimes, such conduct to range from non-cooperation through passive resistance and augmented confusion to vigorously prosecuted guerrilla warfare.

(2) To insure proper planning and appropriate execution:

(a) Detailed planning will be the responsibility of the Government department or agency having primary responsibility in execution of the operation concerned.

(b) Detailed plans will contain an estimate of the political, economic, military and psychological feasibility, acceptability, and applicability of the operation concerned.

(c) Detailed plans will provide for adequate coordination at all levels and will recommend regarding the situation which should surround the moment of execution for producing maximum desired effect.

(3) Execution of detailed plans must be in accordance with political and military considerations surrounding the developing North Korean situation.

3. Action Effects Desired

a. Interference, confusion, and disruption in all aspects of North Korean and Communist Chinese military operations; and in other activities, military or

ANNEX (G)1. Objective

To assist, in Korea and contiguous areas, UN military operations.

2. Discussion

a. In achieving the above objective it is necessary that both overt and covert operations psychological be employed to the limit of our capabilities. Such action, however, must be governed by considerations of the politico-military North Korean and Communist China situation developing.

(1) Detailed plans must be prepared for engendering or inciting, in the North Korean and Chinese troops and civilians, conduct antagonistic to the Soviet-led Communist regimes, such conduct to range from non-cooperation through passive resistance and augmented confusion to vigorously prosecuted guerrilla warfare.

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(b) Detailed plans will contain an estimate of the political, economic, military and psychological feasibility, acceptability, and applicability of the operation concerned.

(c) Detailed plans will provide for adequate coordination at all levels and will recommend regarding the situation which should surround the moment of execution for producing maximum desired effect.

(3) Execution of detailed plans must be in accordance with political and military considerations surrounding the developing North Korean situation.

3. Action Effects Desired

a. Interference, confusion, and disruption in all aspects of North Korean and Communist Chinese military operations; and in other activities, military or

TOP SECRET5. Actions Possible to Secure Psychological Effects Desired

a. The below listed actions are considered to have principal application in achieving the above psychological effects:

- (1) Overt and covert political action.
- (2) Overt and covert propaganda activities.
- (3) Direct action, such as a massive leaflet drop against China mainland population centers.
- (4) Overt and covert economic activities.
- (5) Guerrilla activities.
- (6) Other covert activities.

6. Recommended Action

The following recommendations are made regarding courses of action already being followed; in accordance with established command authority:

a. Department of Defense

- (1) Increase overt and covert propaganda activities by UN armed forces against North Korean and Chinese Communist troops.
- (2) Increase efforts to instill in North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners-of-war an action-creating antagonism to Soviet-led Communism.

b. Central Intelligence Agency

- (1) Increase covert propaganda activities directed at North Korean and Chinese peoples and troops outside the immediate battle zone.
- (2) Conduct such additional covert operations, including guerrilla activities as may achieve either action effects or psychological effects desired.

7. Recommendations Regarding Special Opportunity Action

The following additional action is recommended:

a. Department of Defense

- (1) Plan for, and at such time as it may become politically and militarily feasible and acceptable, prepare for and execute massive

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leaflet drop over population centers of the China mainland (See Appendix (1) to this Annex for some considerations in this operation).

- (2) Develop through estimate stage, and submit to the Psychological Strategy Board for consideration, additional actions for employment in Korea and contiguous areas to assist UN military operations.

b. Central Intelligence Agency

- (1) Develop through estimate stage, and submit to JCS for consideration, additional actions for employment in Korea to assist UN military operations.
- (2) Develop through estimate stage, and submit to the Psychological Strategy Board for consideration, additional actions for employment in areas contiguous to Korea to assist UN military operations.

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ANNEX (G)APPENDIX (1)CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON A LEAFLET DROP OVER THE MAINLAND OF CHINA

1. A leaflet drop over cities of Communist China might be of very great psychological advantage to the United Nations and the United States in bringing about a state of mind among the Chinese people so to influence or deter the Peiping Government in its courses of action.
2. A main reservation as to the utility is in relation to the consideration that the Peiping Government may have pretty thorough control over public opinion in China. That is to say, it has placed impediments to the formation and spreading of group opinion among the Chinese people. Thus the regime has made itself relatively independent of autonomously generated group opinions. The basic consideration as to the value of such a leaflet drop therefore is whether it would serve to break through the control now exercised by the regime.
3. Such leaflets should carry a dignified and complete statement of the case of the United Nations and the United States. It should deal respectfully with the Chinese people. It should concentrate on the points that the United Nations and the United States have acted from no aggressive intention but only to repel aggression, that the interests of the Chinese people have been made subject to designs of action which are contrary to their welfare, that peace is attainable at any time on the basis of true recognition of the motives and the purposes of the United Nations in the Korean struggle. It should emphasize the United Nations framework as distinguished from the United States aspects of the interposition in Korea. By indirection it should raise the question in the minds of the Chinese people whether the Chinese Government does not now act in subordination to alien interests.
4. Such a leaflet drop should be undertaken, if at all, only after the

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struggle has entered a new phase in which the wraps have been taken off air operations beyond the confines of Korea and into China proper. It should be borne in mind that the leaflet drop would involve derogation of air sovereignty over China and would therefore be construable as an act of violence.

5. A relevant question is the question of auspices for the air drop. Whether the authority of the United Nations could be stated on the leaflets without recourse to consent from the other governments involved in the Korean-United Nations operation is a question which would have to be settled in advance.

6. If carried out, such leaflet should aim at maximum coverage in a one-time operation. The planes should fly as far inland as possible and cover as many cities as possible. It might be particularly important to cover the city of Sian as this is reported to be designated as the Chinese Communist capital in the event of the outbreak of a general war. Such leaflets should carry the implicit message that they might have been bombs rather than leaflets. The impact of such a message upon the Chinese people should be carefully estimated by persons conversant with the Chinese background and the present situation.

7. The message should be carefully coordinated by individuals aware of the content of the United Nations' and United States' policy and individuals familiar with Chinese culture and capable of evaluating Chinese reactions. It would be necessary to see that the translation into appropriate dialects was undertaken by individuals capable of dealing with the nuances both of the policy and of the Chinese idiom.

8. An important consideration is as to the precise result to be achieved by such an air drop. To gain maximum advantage it should be planned and executed not merely to create dismay and dissatisfaction among the Chinese people but also to focus their dismay and dissatisfaction in such a way as to bear upon the conduct of the Chinese Communist rulers.

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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300030002-5

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